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  In MENA, household food insecurity, which is closely related to poverty 
and undernourishment, is most severe in rural areas and concentrated within Iraq, Sudan, 
and Yemen. 25% of the MENA population may be poor and 7% undernourished. The key 
to increased national and household-level food security is pro-poor growth, driven by 
export-oriented, labor-intensive sectors. Agricultural sector policies should be 
subordinate to the pro-poor growth goal and not to the goal of food self-sufficiency. Such 
a strategy requires conflict resolution; macroeconomic stability; physical and human 
capital accumulation; reliance on markets and the private sector, and diffusion of 
ecologically friendly farming practices. 
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Food security fears loom large in public policy discussions in Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA).
 1 Food security may be analyzed for units at different conceptual 
levels: regions, countries, households, and individuals. Much analysis of the topic has 
focused on the macro level: food production in the region as a whole (and most of its 
countries) falls far short of food requirements, making it necessary for most countries to 
turn to imports for a large share of domestic food consumption. As a result, the ability of 
most countries to maintain national food security depends on import capacity. On the 
micro level, food security depends on the ability of individual households to meet their 
food requirements. In the low- and middle-income countries of the region, millions of 
households are food insecure, largely as a result of poverty. In the years to come, 
policymakers will face difficult decisions as they try to improve national and household 
food security, while simultaneously striving to achieve other economic and political 
goals.  
In this paper, we analyze the state and evolution of food security in the MENA 
region and discuss policies aimed at improving it. Although this chapter surveys the 
entire region, our main focus is on food security in low- and middle-income countries, 
and particularly on low-income households within those countries. The analyzed unit 
may be defined as being food secure if the probability that its food needs will be met are 
above some minimum ￿acceptable￿ level. This formulation helps underscore the obvious 
but crucial point that uncertainty and risk are inherent in any food security strategy. There 
are always risks with respect to the future, no matter how food is obtained. Any sensible, 
practical food security strategy is essentially a strategy to manage different risks. 
For all the complexity of agricultural systems and policy issues, only three ways 
of obtaining food exist: own production, trade, and grants. The analyzed unit can produce 
its own food, produce something else and trade it for food, or receive food from someone 
else (without exchange and thus as a gift). Each approach has its costs (including risks) 
and benefits. These vary with the level of the analysis and the specific time and place. 
                                                 
1 In this chapter, the MENA region includes all countries classified in this region by the World Bank with 
the exception that Sudan and Turkey are included while Malta and Djibouti are excluded. Israel (not part of 





Conflating national food security with food self-sufficiency implicitly (but, in a drought-
prone region, often implausibly) assumes that domestic production is a less risky mode 
for satisfying domestic demand than is dependence upon international trade.  
A wide range of factors, including government policies, influences the food 
security of a country and its households. At the household level, the issue of food security 
is primarily a problem of income poverty: households with sufficient per-capita 
purchasing power are food secure.2 Government safety nets and poverty alleviation 
measures can play an important role in mitigating household food insecurity while 
policies that support sustainable pro-poor growth can reduce household food insecurity 
over time. At the country level, the capacity to generate a sufficient food supply via 
domestic production or imports is influenced by government policies, most directly by 
measures that influence agricultural production and external balances. The availability of 
natural resources, both those used in agricultural production (especially land and water) 
and those that can generate foreign exchange earnings (including petroleum and natural 
gas) are important parts of the general environment under which the economy and 
government policies function. The relative attractiveness of the different modes of 
obtaining food is also affected by the global trading regime (including WTO rules), over 
which individual countries have a limited (although not necessarily negligible) influence.  
In our exploration of these issues, we will proceed as follows. To provide context, 
Section 2 briefly surveys the economies of the MENA region. Section 3 examines at the 
current state of food security in the region and how it has evolved since the 1970s. 
Section 4 discusses elements of a strategy for improved food security in the low- and 
middle-income countries of the region. Section 5 presents our conclusions.  
 
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE MENA ECONOMIES 
Tables 1 and 2 provide statistics on the broader economic and trade structures of 
most countries in MENA. The countries of the region are quite heterogeneous. On the 
                                                 
 
2  To understand food security at the individual level, we also need to know about the allocation of food 





basis of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, they may be divided into two groups. 
The first group includes high-income countries (in Tables 1 and 2 represented by Kuwait, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia and the UAE but also including some other countries on the Arabian 
Peninsula) whose economies are dominated by petroleum products and natural gas. In 
1999, GNI per capita in these countries ranged from US$10,000 to US$20,000 [at 1995 
purchasing power parity (PPP) prices]. Hydrocarbon exports provide the foreign 
exchange needed to finance a wide range of imports. The economies of this first group of 
countries are very open, as measured by the value of total trade (sum of exports and 
imports in goods and services) relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The shares in 
employment, value-added and exports for their agricultural sectors and the rural 
population shares are all quite low. Illiteracy rates are higher than those in middle-income 
countries, in part a reflection of the fact that, before the 1970s, the income levels and 
educational opportunities for the citizens of these countries were more limited.  
The second group, the low- and middle-income countries of the region, accounts 
for around 90% of the total population. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in these 
countries is lower, in 1999 in the range from US$700 to US$6,000 (at 1995 purchasing 
power parity prices). With some exceptions (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey), illiteracy 
rates are markedly above the average of all middle-income countries. The agricultural 
sector tends to be more important in these countries although its significance varies as a 
reflection of natural resource constraints (especially a lack of water) and strength of other 
sectors. The countries in the second group are also relatively open. Among goods exports, 
fuel, ore and metals (largely petroleum, natural gas and phosphates) are significant in 
most countries. Except for Tunisia and Turkey, the share of manufactures in goods 
exports is below the average for middle-income countries. Imports are dominated by 
manufactures. For most countries, imports of food and agricultural products are 
substantial, ranging between 11% and 34% of total goods imports. For the main staple, 
wheat, this includes heavy reliance on imports to cover domestic consumption. At the 
regional level, wheat imports cover around two thirds of wheat consumption (see Table 
A.1 for additional details). Worker remittances tend to represent a significant share of 
GDP. The primary sources of these remittances are the energy-rich countries of the 





countries). These remittances are often critical to the economic survival of poor 
households (Tzannatos, 2000, p. 7).  
Figure 1 shows annual growth in real household consumption per capita for since 
the mid 1970s to the late 1990s, dividing the period into two sub-periods.
3 For all 
countries except Syria, growth in per-capita consumption was lower (and in some cases 
negative) in the second half of this period. Although a wide range of factors determine 
consumption growth, for many countries the slow-down in growth was driven by changes 
in energy markets (rapid price increases in 1973/74 and 1979/80, and a rapid decline in 
the mid 1980s) which were in turn linked to changes in worker migration (a rapid 
expansion in the number of workers from the mid-1970s to early 1980s and, for the group 
as a whole, probably relatively stagnant numbers since then). For Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
Jordan and Syria a large portion of export earnings come either from energy sales or 
labor migration linked to energy production. Being heavily dependent on worker 
remittances, Jordan was hurt particularly hard by the exclusion of its workers from the 
Kuwaiti labor market after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. By contrast, the 
demand for workers from Egypt and Syria on the Arabian Peninsula remained high and 
may have increased. The reasons were political ￿ unlike Egypt and Syria, Jordan did not 
participate in the international coalition against Iraq. Syria￿s consumption growth was 
also supported by good agricultural performance and continued access to labor migration 
and investment opportunities in Lebanon. For Morocco and Tunisia, which depend 
heavily on the EU for export revenues (primarily food, agriculture, and manufacturing 
exports) and worker remittances, growth is only marginally related to changes in energy 
markets.  
Only sketchy data are available on poverty in MENA. Existing information is also 
quite contradictory, which is hardly surprising. After all, ￿poverty￿ is the modern 
equivalent of classical political economy￿s ￿subsistence,￿ defined as some set of 
commodities without which a person or household is thought to be sufficiently deprived 
                                                 
 
3 To eliminate the influence of year-to-year variations, the figure shows the annual growth rates between 
different points represented by five-year averages. In addition to the consumption data that appear in Figure 






as to be defined as ￿poor.￿  Reasonable people differ sharply over the definition of the 
￿necessary basket of commodities.￿  
Serious issues also bedevil the selection of an appropriate price vector to be used 
in calculating the cost of the basket (e.g., do the poor actually pay the ￿national average￿ 
price?). Given these disagreements, it is not surprising that different studies use different 
poverty lines.
  And these difficulties are limited to an estimate for a single time period.  In 
the MENA region, considerable rainfall variability and occasional political and economic 
turmoil make it difficult to draw conclusions about long-term trends from data for a few 
years. 
Since the World Development Report (WDR) of 1990, the World Bank has used 
the ￿$1 PPP￿ or ￿$2 PPP￿ measures of poverty.
4 Data from two World Bank sources ￿ 
World Development Indicators (2001) and van Eeghen (1995) ￿ are summarized in Table 
3. They suggest that, at the international poverty line of $1 in expenditure per person per 
day at 1985 PPP, the poverty rates are low except for Yemen, a country with one of the 
lowest per-capita income levels in the region.5 For the six countries covered by van 
Eeghen ￿ Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia ￿ the 1990 aggregate 
poverty rate was around 6%. Using this measure, poverty in MENA appears to be 
relatively limited compared to other regions in the developing world  (van Eeghen, 1995, 
p. 6; Ali and Elbadawi, 2000a, pp. 8-9). With a poverty line of $2 the rates jump, an 
indication that a substantial population share lives on expenditures between $1 and $2 per 
person per day. Using the $2 poverty line, van Eeghen estimates an aggregate poverty 
rate of around 25%. National poverty lines vary widely; on average they tend to be closer 
to the $2 line.
6 
 
                                                 
4 The $1 PPP poverty measure shows the proportion of the population living below $1 per day when 
domestic per-capita expenditure data are converted into US dollars using an exchange rate that is based on 
the number of units of the country￿s currency that are required to buy the same amount of goods and 
services in the domestic market as a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States 
 
 
5 When 1993 prices are used instead of 1985 prices, the $1 and $2 poverty lines at 1985 PPP prices have 
been adjusted for inflation to $1.08 and $2.15, respectively (World Bank, WDI 2001, p. 67) 
 





In fact, the Bank’s $1 PPP poverty line, which was designed to reflect the 
standards of what it means to be poor in a poor country (Ravallion, 2002), seems too low 
for most MENA countries. The $1 line is far below average $PPP per capita incomes for 
most countries:  the ratio of per capita GNP to the poverty line, both measured in PPP 
dollars, is unreasonably high when compared with a similar calculation for the U.S. In the 
U.S, GNI per capita is about 6.5 times greater than the poverty line, whereas 
corresponding MENA figures are: Egypt (9.9), Jordan (11.4), Morocco (8.8), and Tunisia 
(13.8) (Danzinger and Weinberg, 1994; World Bank, 2001b).
7  In addition, there are 
other problems with the World Bank￿s estimates, perhaps most importantly related to the 
lack of data that are needed to construct price indices for the consumption baskets of the 
poor.
8 Reddy and Pogge (2002) find that simulations using alternative PPP indices can 
raise estimates of poverty by 25% to 100%.  
While there are disagreements on poverty headcount levels, something of a 
consensus is emerging on poverty trends: most analysts agree that aggregate poverty rates 
in MENA fell during the years of the oil boom (from the mid 1970s to the early to mid 
1980s) but started to rise after that  (Tzannatos, p. 5; van Eeghen and Soman, 1997; 
Kossaifi, 1998, p. 5). Such an observation is compatible with the observed decline in 
growth in per-capita household consumption (cf. Figure 1) and empirical research on the 
MENA region that shows negative growth elasticities of poverty (van Eeghen, 1995, p. 
19; Ali and Elbadawi, 2000a, pp. 9-10). A growing body of empirical research attests that 
this relationship holds across most developing countries. At the level of individual 
MENA countries, Adams and Page (2001) note that Jordanian poverty, which rose 
precipitously 1988 to 1992, has fallen but still remains higher than in 1988. Other 
analysts also find that, despite the decline in Jordanian poverty from 1992 to 1997, 
poverty in the latter year ￿remained far higher than it was in 1988￿ (Shaban et al., 2001, 
p.2). Similarly, a Ford Foundation review of the lively debate over poverty trends in 
Egypt concludes that there was a large rise in the poverty headcount from 1981/2 to 
1990/1 (from 29.7% to 42.4%) and that, although the rate of poverty increase slowed 
                                                 
 
7 In 1992, the US poverty line was $14,335 for a family of four (Danzinger and Weinberg, 1994). 
 
8 For a critique and a response to this critique, see Reddy and Pogge (2002) and Ravallion (2002), 





down during the 1990s, by 1995/96 (the last year for which there are data) the poverty 
headcount stood at 48% of households (Ford Foundation, 1998).  A study of poverty in 
Yemen found that the number of families suffering from malnutrition rose from 9% in 
1992 to 27% in 1999 (El-Maitamy, 2001). An IDRC report concludes that ￿the 
proportion of people living in poverty appears to be rising in most of the region￿s middle 
and lower income countries￿ (Rodenbeck, 2000). Finally, some of the countries for which 
data are missing ￿ most importantly Iraq and Sudan ￿ have large populations and 
relatively high poverty rates (although the exact magnitudes are not known).  
There are other reasons to believe that, despite the difficulties of definitions and 
data, the problem of poverty may be worsening in the region. Ali and Elbadawi (2000b, 
p. 7) cite three factors that seem likely to be the key drivers of the rise in poverty.  First, 
unemployment, whose measurement is also, of course, subject to many difficulties, seems 
not only high, but also rising in many countries. Second, most job creation has occurred 
in the low-wage informal sector, not in higher paying formal sector employment. And 
finally, there is much evidence of falling real wages in formal sector urban employment. 
One might add that in some countries, including Egypt, real wages in agriculture have 
been falling (Richards, 1994; Datt and Olmsted, 1998).  
Who are the poor in MENA? In studies that distinguish between rural and urban 
poverty (based on national poverty lines) rural rates generally exceed urban rates, 
although the size of these gaps vary considerably. For the MENA region as a whole, 70% 
of the poor may live in rural areas, a share that is similar to the worldwide share and far 
above the rural population share in the region of 43% (World Bank, 2001a, p. 1; Bishay, 
1998). Given continuous rural-urban migration, the share of rural areas in overall poverty 
is likely to decline. The poor in MENA are similar to the poor in the rest of the 
developing world in other respects: they lack education, control little land and capital, 
and have a below average nutritional status. In the MENA context, it is also important to 
note that populations in war and conflict zones are overrepresented among the poor (van 
Eeghen, 1995, p. 13; Bishay, 1998, pp. 18-19; Kossaifi, 1998, p. 26). 
In summary, although some measures of poverty suggest that levels of poverty in 
MENA are relatively low, other data contradict this picture. Further, the consensus on the 





security strategy cannot be ignored. In the long run, sustainable household food security 
requires poverty reduction. The fact that poverty remains high and may be increasing in 
many countries strongly suggests that an acceleration of pro-poor growth will be a 
necessary component of any sustainable long-term food security strategy. 
 
III. FOOD SECURITY: CURRENT STATE AND EVOLUTION SINCE 1970 
The concept of food security is separate from but related to standard economic 
indicators of the type discussed in Section 2. In a recent paper, Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000) 
use cluster analysis to classify the countries of the world into three different groups: food 
insecure, food neutral, and food secure.
9 For most countries, their analysis was based on 
data for 1993-1997. Table 4 shows the classification of the MENA countries covered by 
their analysis. Their definition of food security is based on the following indicators: food 
production per capita (measuring the ability of a country to feed itself); the ratio between 
total export earnings and food imports (showing its ability to finance food imports); 
calories per capita and protein per capita (important explanatory variables for changes in 
malnutrition); and the non-agricultural population share (aimed at showing the extent of 
immunity from global changes in trade and agricultural policies) (Diaz-Bonilla et al., 
2000, pp. 6-9). Trade-stress (high food imports relative to export earnings) tends to 
contribute to a lack of food security in MENA more than in other regions.  
Figures 2-5 summarize the long-term evolution of food security in the region 
since the mid 1970s, in part drawing on data used by Diaz-Bonilla et al.
10 To reduce the 
influence of year-to-year variations, we typically compare five-year averages.  
Figure 2 shows values and changes since the 1970s for per-capita food production 
(in constant 1989-91 US$), a macro indicator of food security. For the region as a whole, 
                                                 
 
9 Only countries with missing data were omitted from their analysis. The primary purpose behind their 
work was to analyze whether country classifications recognized by the WTO (developed, developing, least 
developed, and net food importing) capture the extent to which countries are food secure. 
 
10 We did not use one of the indicators in Diaz-Bonilla et al., the non-agricultural population share (since it 
seemed peripheral to our notion of food security). We tested whether their import-stress indicator (food 
imports divided by exports of goods and non-factor services) was sensitive to the addition of worker 
remittances to the denominator. However, this made little difference in terms of over-all trends. The 





the trend is positive: in each decade, the population-weighted average for all sample 
countries grew at an annual rate of 0.5-0.7%. Among individual countries, the picture is 
mixed: the value was higher in 1993/97 than in 1973/77 for eleven countries out of 
sixteen and virtually unchanged for one (Tunisia). Three out of the four countries with 
declines face serious food-security problems.  
Figure 3 summarizes data for another indicator of macro food security, the ratio 
between food imports and the sum of earnings from exports of goods and non-factor 
services. This indicator of food import stress declined drastically for the countries with 
the highest initial values (Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco) but increased substantially for 
Sudan and, to a lesser extent Algeria. Without exception, the energy-rich countries 
(Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) experienced increased stress, a reflection 
of a decline in petroleum and natural gas prices. Data were not available for Iraq and 
Yemen.  
Figure 4 displays the evolution of per-capita calorie consumption per day. In the 
absence of strong distributional shifts (a topic about which little is known), this indicator 
can serve as a proxy for changes in calorie consumption across all households, including 
those that are food insecure. The over-all trend is positive. The high level of average 
calorie consumption indicates that deficiencies in this area are not a serious problem. For 
the period as a whole, the value increased in all countries except the UAE where it 
remained at a very high level by international standards throughout the period. For the 
countries with the lowest levels in 1993/97 (Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen; all below 2500 
calories), growth in per-capita consumption was below average for the period as a whole. 
The incomplete data that is available for Iraq (covering the level of per-capita food 
production and calorie consumption) suggest that the country is food insecure.  
Finally, Figure 5 shows the incidence of undernourishment, based on FAO data. 
Household food security (the ability of households to meet their food requirements) may 
be seen as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the absence of 
undernourishment.
11 For the aggregate of all countries in Figure 5, the share of 
                                                 
 
11 To avoid undernourishment, it is necessary that food secure households (those able to meet food 
requirements) use this ability to actually provide nutritionally adequate food supplies to each individual 





undernourished in the total population declines over time, from 8.8% in 1979/81, to 7.2% 
in 1990/92 and 6.9% in 1997/99. This decline was not sufficient to reduce the absolute 
number of undernourished, which grew from 20.9 millions in 1979/81 to 26.7 million in 
1997/99. In 1997/99, the rates of undernourishment were relatively high in three 
countries, Iraq (13.8%), Sudan (21.1%) and Yemen (33.7%)  ￿ with 18% of the total 
population, they recorded an undernourishment rate of 21% and accounted for as much as 
56% of the undernourished. The aggregate undernourishment rate for the other countries 
was 4%. 
This continued decline in the rate of undernourishment over time and increased 
per-capita calorie consumption seem to contradict the conclusion in the preceding section 
that poverty rates have been on the increase since the mid 1980s. One plausible 
explanation for this is the continued (albeit reduced) presence in most countries of food 
subsidy programs in spite of structural adjustment programs aimed at reducing budget 
deficits.
12 Although often declining, such subsidy programs have protected the food 
security for many at-risk households that have experienced increased poverty.  
To sum up, in the second half of the 1990s, available indicators suggest that food 
insecurity at the national and household levels was a serious problem in Iraq, Sudan, and 
Yemen, countries that also are likely to have the highest poverty rates in the region. At 
the household level, the performance of food security indicators was more positive up to 
the mid 1980s than in more recent years. For the national-level indicators, the picture is 
mixed. For the region as a whole, some of these indicators (per-capita food production 
and food import stress) show stronger gains since the mid 1980s whereas others 
(including per-capita calorie consumption) improved less strongly in more recent years. 
Finally, the influence of political instability and conflicts (internal and external) in on 
food security is obvious from the records of Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon. Continued strife 
makes the challenge of improving food security much greater for the cases of Iraq and 
Sudan. 
 
                                                 
 
12 For a sample of seven Middle East countries, the GDP shares of spending on food subsidies varied from 





IV. POLICIES FOR FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
The preceding section shows that, even if it is difficult to come up with a precise 
figure, millions of people in MENA remain food insecure. Since the mid-1980s, no 
significant dent has been made in these numbers. A majority of the food insecure live in 
the rural areas of the region￿s low- and middle-income countries. What strategies are best 
suited to reduce food insecurity in countries where this is a serious problem? This section 
will attempt to address this question. While recognizing that the details of any strategy 
are country-specific, we will look for common denominators.  
At the outset, it should be stressed that strategies for improved food security have 
to transcend pure economic considerations. For many countries, it is essential to strive for 
solutions to the external and internal conflicts that plague the region. Although all 
conflicts cannot be easily resolved (for some parties they may be a struggle for 
existence), those involved should recognize that these conflicts are pursued at high costs 
in the form of less growth, poverty reduction, and food security. 
In order to address economic considerations, it is helpful to return to the point that 
food can be obtained from three sources, own production, trade, and grants. At the 
national level, the choice is essentially between the first two (excluding periods of 
extreme crisis when food aid in grant form may be important). With a few exceptions (for 
instance Turkey), it is not feasible for MENA countries to become food secure through 
exclusive reliance on domestic production, even if this striving were limited to basic 
foodstuffs. Arid zones with variable rainfall cannot escape weather or geography: 
domestic production is highly risky and severely limited by the constraints of nature. The 
MENA region is the driest in the world. Renewable water resources are 1,250 cubic 
meters per capita, corresponding to a mere 17% of the world average and 38% of the 
value for the second driest region. Water availability also varies widely within MENA, 
with several countries having less than 200 cubic meters per capita.
 13 In most of the 
populous countries of the region, problems of water quality are also serious (World Bank 
1994). 
                                                 
 





In recent years, production growth has been underpinned by irrigation expansion; 
for the countries covered in Table 1, the total irrigated area increased at an annual rate of 
2.0% between 1984-86 and 1997-99, reaching 36% of the total cropland (World Bank, 
2001b).
14 This suggests that the domestic production route will be even more difficult in 
the future, as competition from non-agricultural demands for domestic water supplies will 
increase, severely limiting the room for irrigated agriculture. Hence, although much of 
the food that is consumed domestically will continue to come from domestic sources, 
reliance on trade is crucial for national food security in the face of long-run domestic 
trends for demand and supply and short-run variability in domestic supply. For basic 
grains (which are at the center of calls for self-sufficiency), reliance on imports is made 
increasingly attractive by a long-run downward trend in world prices that is expected to 
continue in the future (Rosegrant et al., 2001, p. 64).  
The main reason evoked for food self-sufficiency is that reliance on imports 
makes countries vulnerable to external pressure and embargoes in times of international 
conflict. Although the concern is valid, the efficacy of the remedy is doubtful: the 
empirical record suggests that cuts in domestic supplies due to droughts are far more 
significant (cf. Hazell et al. in this volume) than cuts in import supplies due to 
embargoes. We would suggest that, to reduce the likelihood of being exposed to 
international blackmail, countries should strive to resolve conflicts, contribute to a rule-
based international trading system, nurture alliances with different country groups, 
diversify trade (including food imports) across multiply countries, and maintain sufficient 
food stocks. In short, for most countries, measures other than attempts to increase 
domestic supplies are key to enhancing national food security also in times of 
international conflict. 
Households can obtain food security through a combination of own production, 
market purchases of food, and grants. Grants (explicit in the form of transfers or implicit 
in food subsidies) can play a significant role by protecting vulnerable or chronically food-
insecure households, exemplifying how, at any given income level, complementary 
policies can boost food security. However, the key to reduced food insecurity is higher 
                                                 
 





incomes for groups that suffer from food insecurity. Policies aimed at food self-
sufficiency as an objective in its own right, for producing households and/or for the 
nation, may come at the cost of reduced household poverty and food insecurity as low-
income producers forego the higher incomes that can be realized from high-value 
products (fruits, vegetables, or livestock products), sold in domestic or foreign markets.  
Against this background ￿ risky domestic production, limited scope for domestic 
production growth, likely contradictions between staple food production and reduced 
household food insecurity, and a long-term downward trend in international grain prices 
￿ we propose that, for the low- and middle-income countries of the MENA region, a 
strategy for national and household food security should be a strategy for pro-poor 
growth that generates enough foreign-exchange earnings to complement domestic food 
supplies with imports, i.e. a trade-based strategy for food security. Labor-intensive 
exports can play a crucial role, not only as a source of foreign exchange but also by 
boosting real wages of poor people. Agricultural sector policies should be subordinate to 
the goal of rapid, pro-poor growth, not food self-sufficiency. 
What are the main ingredients of a trade-based strategy for food security? What 
lessons can be learned from the literature on growth and poverty reduction in developing 
countries in general and in the MENA region in particular? A large and growing body of 
empirical research strongly shows that, in the recent history of developing countries, 
more rapid growth is the key to poverty reduction. On the basis of household survey data 
from the 1980s and the 1990s for a wide cross-section of countries, Ravallion (2000, p. 8-
9) computes a growth elasticity of poverty of ￿2.5: for every 1% increase in mean 
household income, the proportion of the population living on less than $1 per day (at 
1993 PPP) declines by 2.5%. Empirical research also shows negative growth elasticities 
of poverty for the subset of the MENA countries for which the required data exist (van 
Eeghen, 1995, p. 19; Ali and Elbadawi, 2000a, pp. 9-10).  
What are the factors that together boost growth? There is a broad consensus that 
the list of growth-promoting factors includes the following core: macroeconomic 
stability; rapid accumulation of physical and human capital; and reliance on the private 
sector for the production of most goods and services (Rodrik, 1999; Dollar 2000). Other 





the growth-enhancing roles of openness to trade and export orientation, reliance on 
market forces, and the removal of price distortions. Together this latter set of factors may 
enhance the efficiency of resource allocation and facilitate the application of appropriate 
technologies.  
Table 5 shows the performance of the MENA countries in relation to some of the 
growth-promoting factors that were referred to in the preceding paragraph, comparing 
average values for 1997-99 and 1984-86.
15 On the positive side, the numbers suggests 
that, for the region as a whole, macro stability has increased ￿ inflation, budget deficits, 
and debt service have declined for most countries ￿ while trade restrictions (indicated by 
import duties as share of imports) have declined. On average, the structure of government 
spending (indicated by shares of GDP allocated to the government wage bill and its 
spending on education) has changed little. On the negative side, the GDP shares of 
investment and manufacturing exports have declined. Countries n the MENA region are 
distinguished by their lack of success in developing manufacturing exports, their 
allocation of more resources to government employment (and government consumption), 
and their smaller foreign debt service burden.
16 
These averages hide significant differences between different countries. Egypt is 
perhaps the country with the most positive changes, as indicated by improved macro 
stability, reductions in the government wage bill, and reduced trade barriers. However, its 
investments in human and physical capital have not increased and manufacturing exports 
are stagnant. Jordan and Tunisia also show improvements according to most indicators, 
including more successful performance then Egypt in terms of investments and 
manufacturing exports. In Tunisia, manufacturing exports accounted for 23% of GDP at 
the end of the 1990s. Compared to Egypt, Iran￿s performance has been less successful in 
                                                 
 
15 The reader should keep in mind that it is an over-simplification to infer from aggregate data whether 
growth-promoting changes have occurred or not. For example, human and physical capital accumulation 
depends not only on the level of spending on education and investment but also on the efficiency of the 
spending that takes place. Moreover, the growth impact on the resulting capital accumulation depends on 
the extent to which various complementary factors are present. 
 
16 The GDP shares for government consumption declined on average from 24% to just below 20% for the 
countries that appear in Table 5. The strongest declines were registered for Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia 
(for the latter from a very high starting point). The averages for the comparator groups of low- and middle-





terms of macro stability but the country has managed to increase both investment and 
government spending on education. Information on the share of total investment 
originating in the private sector is available for a few of the MENA countries. Among 
these, the private share has increased noticeably in Egypt and Morocco but changed little 
in Iran and Tunisia.  
More basically, the region￿s disappointing economic performance may reflect 
shortcomings in terms of more fundamental determinants of economic growth, most 
importantly the functioning of the government and other institutions that define the 
environment in which private agents function [cf. Hall and Jones (1999) on the role of 
these factors in growth]. There is a growing realization that, in most countries of the 
MENA region, governments have failed in critical core functions (inter alia, assuring that 
the education is universal and of high quality, and establishing an enabling framework for 
private sector investment and production). At the same time, governments have expanded 
into areas in which they lack a comparative advantage, such as directly producing 
standardized commodities. Moreover, by promulgating excessive regulations that are 
impossible to enforce, governments are often actively destructive, protecting relatively 
privileged groups (including large state-owned enterprises or corporations and their 
employees) at the expense of the majority of workers who are completely unprotected.
17 
For countries pursuing export-oriented strategies, the development of a flexible 
institutional structure is particularly important, given the need to respond rapidly to 
changes in highly discriminating international markets. Such a strategy puts difficult 
demands on governments, forcing them to embark on new activities, abandoning some of 
the activities they have pursued historically. Important, new roles governments should 
play include the setting of quality standards, the provision of modern infrastructure 
(physical, social and legal), the maintenance of a competitive exchange rate, and the 
training of the labor force in basic skills.  
While more rapid growth typically is associated with more rapid poverty 
reduction, it is also the case that, at any given growth rate, the rate of poverty reduction 
                                                 
 
17 As an example, in Egypt, a citizen wishing to obtain a piece of desert land, build a dwelling unit, and 
register the property must go through 77 bureaucratic procedures, a process that can take between 6 and 14 





may vary widely across countries and time periods depending on structural conditions 
and policies pursued. In addition to promoting growth, any strategy for poverty reduction 
has to focus on boosting incomes the poor earn from their assets, by raising the quantity 
of assets they control, by improving asset productivity, and/or by raising demand and 
prices for the services produced by these assets. If inequality is lower, the poverty-
reducing effects of any given rate of mean income growth is higher (Ravallion, 2000, pp. 
19-21). When designing a policy for poverty reduction, policymakers should, of course, 
consider the characteristics of the poor. In the MENA regions (as in most other parts of 
the developing world), the poor lack education and control little or no land and capital. 
Predominantly, they live in rural areas. The labor market can play a crucial role in 
reducing poverty (Ali and Elbadawi, 2000a, p. 15; Tzannatos, 2000, p. 5). Education 
policies, sensitive to the demands of the labor market and improving the human capital of 
the poor can contribute to growth in labor productivity and real wages. Given the fact that 
the region is lagging in human capital accumulation, increased efficiency in the education 
sector and, perhaps, increased spending on education should be a higher priority (cf. 
Table 5).
18 The challenge of raising the wages of the poor is made more difficult by rapid 
labor force growth: between 1985 and 1999, the total labor force for the MENA countries 
in Table 1 grew by 2.7% per year as opposed to 1.9% for the group of all low- and 
middle-income countries (World Bank, 2001b). On average and for most individual 
countries, current GDP growth rates are considerably below the rates of 5-6% that are 
needed to absorb new labor force entrants and reduce the existing high levels of 
unemployment (ERF, 2000) (cf. Table A.2).  
Significant real wage growth will be difficult without rapid expansion of labor-
intensive exports. Given the limited room for agricultural expansion, most of the growing 
labor force will have to be absorbed by manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, services. 
From this perspective, it is troublesome that, with the exception of Tunisia, none of the 
low- and middle-income countries have managed to develop significant manufacturing 
exports (cf. Table 5). Consequently, the countries in the region need to develop new areas 
                                                 
 
18 Shafik (1994) notes that, in the Arab countries, human resource development is poor in spite of relatively 
high public spending on education. Inter alia, she proposes that spending inefficiency may be a major 





of comparative advantage, considering country-specific conditions and access to export 
markets. The analysis of Devlin (in this volume) suggests that high-value agriculture 
(involving a reallocation of agricultural production) and manufacturing based on 
agriculture and natural resources are promising export sectors for many countries.
19 
Rapid export expansion in these sectors would require integrated foreign and domestic 
policies. In the foreign policy area, there is a need to improve market access (especially 
for targeted export sectors) through more aggressive and coordinated positions in the 
context of WTO and Euro-Med Partnership negotiations. Growth dynamics would also be 
enhanced by intra-Arab trade liberalization. In the domestic policy area, a major obstacle 
to more rapid export growth is high transactions costs. These costs can be brought down 
by investments in improved infrastructure, reduced red tape, and unilateral removal of 
trade barriers for producer services (including finance, transportation and storage 
services). In most country settings, other complementary domestic policies include the 
maintenance of a competitive exchange rate, a general lowering of import barriers 
(reducing costs via improved access to imported inputs and improving export incentives 
via the resulting devaluation). Together with improvements in infrastructure, refined 
water policies and investment in improved water, land, and range management practices 
are needed to better realize the potential contribution of agriculture to growth and poverty 
reduction. From a poverty perspective, improvements in rural infrastructure (including 
and telecommunications) would have the advantage of inducing a general reduction in 
rural transactions costs and, thereby, improve rural terms of trade (the ratio between the 
prices at which rural areas sell and buy in their trade with urban areas and the rest of the 
world). 
Such policies are particularly important for crafting a sustainable food security 
strategy. Here, as elsewhere in the world, the problems of raising food production and 
rural incomes in the coming decades are made more complicated by increasingly tight 
ecological constraints. There are reasons for concern that some agricultural sectors in the 
region are already approaching, or have exceeded, ecological limits. For example, the use 
of fertilizers per hectare in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine are among the highest in the 
                                                 
 






world; consequently, the concentration of nitrate in the coastal aquifer of Gaza and Israel 
has doubled during the past two decades (Brooks, 2000). The problem of soil salinity is 
acute in many of the region￿s most productive irrigated lands, such as in Egypt, where the 
problem afflicts perhaps 30% of the cultivated area (Postel, 2001). Overpumping of 
groundwater is equally endemic.  
The problems of sustainability may be most acute in one of the region￿s poorest 
countries, Yemen. The area irrigated by wells rose from 37,000 hectares in 1970 to 
368,000 in 1996. Government policy strongly encouraged this development. Until 1995, 
diesel fuel was priced around $0.02 per liter, while international prices ranged from $0.15 
and $0.20 per liter. Agricultural borrowers also enjoyed generous interest subsidies on 
investments in wells (paying interest rates of 9-11% compared to market rates of 50-
60%).  Consequently water was priced at $0.04 per cubic meter, although covering only 
the marginal cost of extraction would have required a price three to five times higher. 
Finally, the government protected the domestic fruit and vegetable market, and did 
nothing to restrict the boom in qat (a mildly narcotic drug, which uses some 30% of all 
irrigation water in the country) (Ward, 2000). Unsurprisingly, IWMI (International Water 
Management Institute) experts describe the groundwater situation in the country as a 
￿basket case.￿ Extraction now exceeds recharge by 400%, and ￿Yemen is probably the 
only country where groundwater extraction exceeds recharge for the country as a whole￿ 
(Shah et al., 2000, p. 1). Water tables have fallen dramatically, as wells have been 
deepened two to four times in the Sa￿adah basin (Liechtenthaeler and Turton, 1999). The 
very respectable growth of Yemeni agriculture during the past decade (5.0% per year) is 
clearly unsustainable, which has serious negative implications for the welfare of the 
country, where roughly 75% of the labor force works in agriculture. In Yemen, and 
throughout the region, a viable food security strategy will have to pay more attention to 
using natural resources sustainably.  
Finally, in addition to enabling the poor to earn higher incomes in production, 
there is invariably a need for a social safety net which provides a minimum standard of 
living on an intermittent basis for large parts of the population and on a permanent basis 
for the small pockets of the population that, for structural reasons, are unable to earn a 





means to achieve this may include targeted food subsidies, public works programs, as 
well as pensions and various kinds of cash transfers.  
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The economies of the MENA region are diverse in terms of economic structure, 
living standards, and food security. They may be divided into two groups, high-income 
countries, whose entire economies are dominated by petroleum and natural gas, and low- 
and middle-income countries with more diversified economic structures, including a 
more significant agricultural sector. Across these differences, most of the economies of 
the region, especially in the Middle East, are heavily dependent on the energy production, 
either directly as the major source of export revenues or indirectly though remittances 
from laborers working on energy-rich countries.  
For most countries in the region, growth in household real per-capita consumption 
was rapid between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s, but has since slowed down, in some 
cases becoming negative. These trends were mainly driven by swings in international 
energy prices. The data on poverty in MENA is sketchy and contradictory. On balance, 
available evidence indicates that poverty remains a serious problem in the low- and 
middle-income countries of the region. When, relative to average income, sensible 
poverty lines are used (in terms of PPP dollars, more close to $2 than $1 per day), 25% of 
the total population may be classified as poor. In MENA (as well as elsewhere in the 
developing world) poverty is disproportionately a rural phenomenon: although rural areas 
only house 43% of the total population, as many as 70% of the poor may be located in 
rural areas. Geographically, poverty problems appear to be most severe in Iraq, Sudan, 
and Yemen; in each of these countries, internal and/or international wars have retarded 
economic progress and aggravated poverty. Most analysts agree that, in the context of 
growing unemployment and stagnant wages, poverty rates have been on the increase 
since the mid 1980s. 
Food security may be analyzed for units at different conceptual levels; our focus 
is on the country and household levels. A country or a household is food secure if the 





major ways of meeting food needs are own production and trade, in some cases 
supplemented by grants.  
The MENA region suffers from a scarcity of rain and water resources, putting 
severe limits on future growth in agricultural production (barring technological 
breakthroughs). In response to growth in population and per-capita incomes, the region 
has turned to imports when trying to satisfy the demand for food. This is not necessarily 
an indication of food insecurity. On the contrary, in a drought-prone region like MENA, 
reliance on trade for a substantial share of food consumed is likely to enhance food 
security. However, for some countries in the region, the fact that food imports correspond 
to a large share of total export earnings is an indication of country-level food insecurity. 
Food security is also challenged by some unsustainable farming practices (e.g., 
overpumping of groundwater, salinization, rising pollution of aquifers). 
At the household level, food security is closely related to the absence of poverty 
and undernourishment. From this perspective, the poverty trends that were referred to 
above are a source of concern. The undernourishment indicator has the advantage of 
being available for most countries at multiple points in time. The numbers suggest that, 
since 1979/81, the share of the MENA population that is undernourished has declined 
(from 8.8% to 6.9%) but the number of undernourished has increased (from 21 to 27 
million). The numbers show that undernourishment is concentrated in countries with the 
most severe poverty problems ￿ Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen. These three countries account 
for 56% of the undernourished but only 18% of the MENA population. Their rate of 
undernourishment is 21% as opposed to merely 4% for the rest of the MENA region.  
The paths toward less poverty and more food security in the MENA region are 
full of challenges. The countries of the region are diverse in terms of their current 
economic structure, geographical location, and growth prospects. Nevertheless, for most 
of the low- and middle-income countries in the MENA region, the key to increased food 
security, both at the national and household levels, is rapid, pro-poor growth, driven by 
expansion in export-oriented, labor-intensive sectors and complemented with safety nets 
to protect those who cannot share in the benefits. Such a strategy would enhance 





returns that accrue to the main asset of the food insecure. It would enhance national food 
security by generating the foreign exchange that is needed to finance food imports.  
It is essential to let trade play a major role in improving future food security. 
Given the very tight region-wide water constraint, a strategy aimed at meeting expected 
growth in food demand (driven by growth in population and, hopefully, incomes) from 
domestic supplies is unlikely to succeed. In the context of this strategy, a large share of 
domestic demand would continue to be met by domestic production. However, the role of 
the agricultural sector would be subordinate to the goal of rapid, pro-poor growth, not 
food self-sufficiency.  
For most countries, the core, integrated elements in such a strategy include 
resolution of external and internal conflicts; macroeconomic stability; rapid accumulation 
of physical and human capital; and, relative to the current situation, increased reliance on 
market forces and the private sector, and rapid diffusion of more ecologically-friendly 
farming practices. The policies of the outside world can facilitate economic progress in 
the MENA region in many ways, perhaps most importantly by providing market access to 
the region￿s exports and contributing to equitable and lasting solutions to the region￿s 
conflicts.  
During the last decade, many MENA countries have improved macroeconomic 
stability. The role of markets and the private sector have become more significant. 
However, many elements of the strategy are still only weakly present in much of the 
region. For most countries, physical and human capital investments, and manufacturing 
exports remain low compared to other regions. More fundamentally, there are many signs 
that governments in MENA have failed in critical core functions while performing certain 
activities that are destructive and reinforce existing inequalities. 
Finally, many countries, in particular those with the most severe food insecurity 
problems, are bogged down in conflicts. Conflict resolution would accelerate capital 
accumulation by channeling resources to productive (or non-destructive) uses and 
encouraging investments (instead of brain drain and capital flight). A more peaceful 
environment would also reduce the likelihood that countries pursuing trade-based food 





political alliances, food stocks, and support for a rule-based international trading system 
would serve the same end. 
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World Bank, 2001b. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C Table 1. Selected indicators of economic structure and living standards in MENA.
GDP by sector (% of total) Current account (% of GDP)
Rural
GNI p.c Adult Popul- popul- Agricultural Openness Worker
(’000PPP illiteracy ation ation labor force Agri- Manuf- Other Goods Service Goods Service (Exports+ remit-
1995 $) (%) (mill) (%) (% of total) culture acturing Industry Services exports exports imports imports Imports) tances
High-Income Countries
Kuwait 19.6 18.1 2 2.4 1.2 0 11 43 46 41.5 5.7 22.7 14.4 84.2
Libya 20.9 5 13.9 10.9
Saudi Arabia 10.1 23.9 20 15.0 19.2 7 10 38 45 36.4 3.9 18.5 9.4 67.7
UAE 18.1 24.9 3 13.6 7.8 2 8 50 40 65.4 131.3
Low- and Middle-Income Countries
Algeria 4.4 33.4 30 40.4 26.1 11 10 41 38 26.6 0.8 14.8 8.5 51.0 2.0
Egypt 3.2 45.4 63 54.7 34.0 17 20 12 51 5.0 10.2 19.0 5.3 40.4 4.2
Iran 5.0 24.3 63 38.9 23.0 21 17 14 48 11.5 1.2 12.1 4.4 37.6 0.4
Iraq 45.2 23 23.5 16.1 .. .. ..
Jordan 3.5 10.8 5 25.0 5.9 2 16 10 72 22.5 21.1 42.9 18.9 105.4 20.6
Lebanon 4.1 14.4 4 11.5 7.3 12 10 12 66 4.9 5.6 47.1 3.9 61.7 15.6
Morocco 3.0 52.0 28 45.1 36.0 15 17 15 53 21.5 8.9 28.4 5.7 64.3 5.5
Sudan 43.1 29 64.8 69.0 40 9 9 42 8.0 0.5 12.4 4.7
Syria 3.2 26.4 16 45.1 28.2 25 28 4 43 19.6 8.5 18.5 21.6 69.0 2.5
Tunisia 5.2 30.1 9 37.0 21.6 13 18 10 59 28.0 13.9 38.3 5.8 86.0 3.6
Turkey 5.9 15.4 64 26.1 43.0 16 15 9 60 15.8 8.8 21.4 5.5 50.1 2.4
Yemen 0.7 54.8 17 75.7 61.0 17 11 30 42 23.8 3.3 34.9 10.5 84.0 18.1
Source: World Bank (2001b)
Note: Data are for 1999 or for the most recent preceding year with available dataTable. 2. Merchandise trade structure 1993-99, selected MENA countries (%).
Exports* Imports*
Food & Fuel, Ore Manuf- Food & Fuel, Ore Manuf-
Agriculture & Metals acturing Agriculture & Metals acturing
Kuwait 0.5 86.9 12.7 16.8 2.4 80.9
Libya 0.4 95.6 4.0 21.6 1.2 77.2
Saudi Arabia 0.9 89.5 9.6 16.2 3.7 80.2
UAE 8.6 48.7 42.7 12.9 5.6 81.5
Algeria 0.7 95.7 3.6 32.9 2.7 64.4
Egypt 15.6 45.0 39.3 32.1 6.2 61.7
Iran
Iraq
Jordan 23.3 26.4 50.3 23.9 14.6 61.5
Lebanon
Morocco 32.9 14.8 52.3 23.0 18.8 58.2
Sudan 96.3 0.6 3.1 20.0 17.2 62.7
Syria 22.9 66.3 10.8 22.7 4.6 72.7
Tunisia 10.4 9.8 79.8 13.7 9.8 76.5
Turkey 19.9 3.7 76.4 10.5 16.4 73.0
Yemen 4.8 94.6 0.7 33.9 8.6 57.5
Low income
Middle income 12.5 17.1 70.4 10.8 12.5 76.7
Source: World Bank (2001b)
*Sectoral shares sum to 100 (after minor scaling to remove data errors)
Data are average of last 5 years with data (1993-1999)Table 3. Poverty estimates for selected MENA countries.
International poverty line National poverty line (1)
<$1/day <$2/day year source rural urban national year source
Algeria 1.8 1985 2 16.6 7.3 12.2 1988 1
1.2 1990 2 30.3 14.7 22.6 1995 1
1.6 1994 2
<2.0 15.1 1995 1
Egypt 7.5 1985 2 23.3 22.5 22.9 1995-96
5.6 1990 2
6.1 1994 2
3.1 52.7 1995 1
Iran 6.5 1985 2
8.9 1990 2
6.9 1994 2
Jordan 4.2 1985 2 15.0 1991 1
12.6 1990 2 11.7 1997 1
13.8 1994 2
<2.0 7.4 1997 1
Morocco 7.1 1985 2 18.0 7.6 13.1 1990-91 1
2.5 1990 2 27.2 12.0 19.0 1998-99 1
1.6 1994 2
<2.0 7.5 1990-91 1
Tunisia 4.6 1985 2 29.2 12.0 19.9 1985 1
2.9 1990 2 21.6 8.9 14.1 1990 1
1.6 1994 2
<2.0 10.0 1995 1
Turkey 2.4 18.0 1994
Yemen 15.7 45.2 1998 19.2 18.6 19.1 1992
Sources:
1 = World Bank (2001b)
2 = van Eeghen (1995, p. 5)Table 4. Food security in MENA, 1993-1997.
Food Security Group Countries
Insecure (74)* Sudan, Yemen
Neutral (51)* Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia
Secure (37)* Turkey, UAE
Source: Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000, pp. 55-57)
*The numbers in brackets show the total number of countries in the world that belong to the group. 
Note: Iraq and most of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (except for Kuwait and the UAE) were
 not included in this analysis because of a lack of data.Table 5. Macro and growth indicators for selected MENA countries.
Inflation*  Budget deficit Gov. wages Gov educ spending Import duties GFCF Manuf exports Debt service
(%) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of imports) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of exports)
1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆ 1997-99 ∆
Algeria 4.5 -5.9 0.3 7.5 0.0 5.4 -2.3 26.0 -7.0 0.7 0.4 36.0 -6.9
Egypt 4.0 -13.7 1.0 -10.0 6.2 -3.2 4.7 -0.8 16.1 -12.4 19.0 -5.7 1.8 0.7 9.4 -15.3
Iran 18.4 6.6 2.3 -3.0 11.9 0.8 4.7 0.9 11.3 -14.4 23.0 5.3 25.0 19.9
Jordan 2.7 0.4 3.7 -3.3 14.8 -3.5 7.6 2.4 12.3 -3.0 22.3 0.7 7.7 1.7 15.0 -1.6
Kuwait 1.3 0.1 3.7 21.0 15.1 3.2 5.9 0.1 3.2 -0.5 14.0 -7.0 7.6 -7.4
Lebanon 8.5 20.7 7.6 2.4 14.0 27.5 10.1
Morocco 1.5 -8.1 2.5 11.0 0.8 5.3 -0.7 18.4 4.9 22.3 0.0 3.5 -3.1 24.9 -8.1
Saudi Arabia -0.6 2.0 5.5 5.7 -2.6 17.7 -7.3 1.3 1.0
Sudan 26.6 -8.1 1.0 -1.8 17.3 5.7 0.1 8.4 -8.2
Syria -0.3 -21.1 0.3 -3.0 3.8 -2.1 31.6 25.5 27.3 4.0 1.7 -0.5 7.4 -18.2
Tunisia 3.2 -4.3 2.0 -3.7 11.2 1.2 6.3 0.7 16.6 -11.6 25.0 -3.3 23.1 13.1 15.7 -9.7
Turkey 78.4 35.8 9.7 4.3 8.1 4.3 3.0 1.2 2.3 -4.0 24.3 9.0 10.5 4.1 23.4 -9.4
UAE 1.3 0.0 -0.5 3.7 -0.7 2.0 0.1 23.3 -4.3 0.0 -21.9
Yemen 14.5 2.3 10.9 5.5 13.5 21.0 0.1 3.6
Middle East & North Africa 5.2 -0.8 21.7 -2.7 1.3 0.2 13.6 -2.5
Low income 3.7 -1.3 3.9 -0.2 21.0 1.7 5.9 2.6 19.7 -2.2
Middle income 3.0 -2.7 4.2 -2.6 4.9 1.0 24.0 1.3 14.3 11.7 18.7 -4.4
Source: World Bank (2001b)
Notes:
If not available, data for 1997-99 have been replaced by data for less recent three-year period in the 1990s.
∆ = value for 1997-99 minus value for 1984-86
Data are not available for Iraq and Libya
*CPI except for Lebanon and the UAE. 1996-98 for Lebanon, UAE and Yemen.Table A.1. MENA self-sufficiency in wheat, 
1983-87 and 1995-99 (%).
Average Average
1983-87 1995-99 ∆
Algeria 24.8 29.1 4.2
Egypt 23.2 48.3 25.1 C
Iran 73.2 69.7 -3.5
Iraq 23.9 44.4 20.4 C
Jordan 15.3 7.0 -8.2
Kuwait 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lebanon 7.5 12.7 5.2
Libya 21.5 9.9 -11.6
Morocco 55.9 52.8 -3.0 C
Saudi Arabia 107.1 109.5 2.5
Sudan 20.7 46.7 26.0 C
Syria 61.4 112.4 51.0 C
Tunisia 50.9 50.3 -0.6
Turkey 100.6 97.7 -2.9
UAE 0.8 0.1 -0.7
Yemen 8.1 7.2 -1.0
MENA 61.7 65.2 3.5
Low-Income Countries 85.6 86.1 0.4
Source: FAO (2000)
Note: 
1. self-sufficiency = 100*[production]/[consumption] where
consumption is the sum of production and net imports
2. data are averages of individual year self-sufficiency rates
3. MENA self-sufficiency rates are computed using data
on total production and trade for the countries in the tableTable A.2. Annual growth in GDP at factor 









Source: World Bank (2001b).
Note: Growth rates are computed using
 three-year moving averages (1978 = 1977-79, etc.)Figure 1. Growth in household consumption per capita in 
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